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MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION IN
WASHINGTON: RELEVANCE OF THE IDENTITY
AND ACTIONS OF AN EMPLOYEE'S SPOUSE
Katrina R. Kelly
Abstract: Before 1993, Washington's employment anti-discrimination statute did not
define the term "marital status," and courts interpreted the term broadly to include

discrimination based upon the actions or identity of an employee's spouse. A 1993
amendment to the Law Against Discrimination added a definition of marital status. Although
the Supreme Court of Washington has not yet considered the impact of this amendment, the
dissent in Magula v. Benton Franklin Title
Co. argued that the change in the statute should
narrow the interpretation of marital status to exclude the identity and actions of an employee's
spouse. This Comment argues that the scope of the law against marital status discrimination is
unaffected by the 1993 amendment, which clarified, rather than changed, existing law.

Acme Company owns and operates a largefish processingplant in
Washington State. Acme hires a new manager,Sandy, who has excellent
credentials.Sandy proves to be diligent, honest, and creative,possessing
all the professional and personal qualities Acme desires. Six months
later, Acme discovers that Sandy's spouse, Mark has recently been
accused of child sexual abuse. The allegations against Mark make front
page news in the localpaper. That same day, Sandy's friend, who is the
secretary to Acme's CEO, tells Sandy that she overhearda conversation
between the CEO and Sandy's supervisor. The CEO had said that he did
not want Mark associatedwith Acme in any way, andSandy would have
to be terminated ifshe did not get a divorce. Sandy is in a dilemma:
although she would like to support Mark through this crisis, she feels
that herjob, which is terminable "at will," is in jeopardy. The following
week the allegationsagainstMark receive nationalmedia attention, and
Sandy's name is mentioned in several newspaper articles. Acme
terminates Sandy's employment.

Should Sandy be able to bring a legal claim against Acme for
discrimination on the basis of marital status? The answer depends on the
interpretation of the term "marital status." If marital status is interpreted
narrowly, to encompass only the condition of being single, married,
widowed, or divorced,' then Sandy will not be able to bring such a claim;
1. When reference is made to the "narrow interpretation" of marital status in this Comment, it
refers only to the condition of being married, single, widowed, divorced, or separated, without
incorporating any reference to the identity or actions of a person's spouse. See infra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text.
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the mere condition of being married did not lead to her dismissal.

However, if marital status is construed more broadly, to include the
identity and actions of a person's spouse,2 then Sandy will be entitled to

bring a claim for legal relief. On the facts above, it is possible that Acme
dismissed Sandy because her spouse is a person accused of child sexual
abuse.
This Comment examines the interpretation of the term "marital status"

in Washington's anti-discrimination law.3 Traditionally, Washington
courts have construed the term broadly, to include the identity and
actions of an employee's spouse.' In Magula v. Benton Franklin Title
Co.,5 however, in which an employee was fired following allegations that
her husband was harassing her co-workers, the Supreme Court of
Washington left open the question of whether it would continue to
construe the statute broadly.' The dissent in that case argued that, in light
of a 1993 amendment to the anti-discrimination statute,7 the court should
not interpret marital status broadly!
This Comment argues that a narrow interpretation of marital status
fails to fulfill the purpose of the anti-discrimination statute. A broad
interpretation, in contrast, is compatible with the 1993 amendment, and

Washington courts should therefore maintain this protection for
employees by continuing to interpret the term broadly. Part I of this
Comment provides an overview of how marital status anti-discrimination
laws are treated nationally and examines the development of

Washington's law against marital status discrimination. Part II analyzes

2. When reference is made to the "broad interpretation" of marital status in this Comment, it refers
to an interpretation that includes consideration of the identity and actions of a person's spouse. See
infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
3. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 49.60 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
4. Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62,
586 P.2d 1149 (1978) (upholding Human Rights Commission's anti-nepotism rules, which broadly
interpreted marital status to include identity of employee's spouse).
5. 131 Wash. 2d 171, 930 P.2d 307 (1997) (applying Washington law prior to 1993 legislative
amendment to Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040, and finding that genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether employee was dismissed because of her marital status).
6. Id. at 181, 930 P.2d at313.
7. '"Marital status' means the legal status of being married, single, separated, divorced, or
widowed." Law Against Discrimination, ch. 510, § 4, 1993 Wash. Laws 2331, 2334 (codified at
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(7) (1996 & Supp. 1997)).
8. Magula, 131 Wash. 2d at 185-92, 930 P.2d at 315-18 (Sanders, J., dissenting). The majority
found that the 1993 amendment was not applicable in Magulda because the facts in the case occurred
before the amendment became effective. d at 181, 930 P.2d at 313.

Marital Status Discrimination
relevant policies and issues of statutory interpretation and argues that

Washington should continue to interpret marital status broadly.
I.

THE LAW AGAINST MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION

A.

An Overview of MaritalStatus Anti-DiscriminationLaws

The default rule for an employment relationship in the United States
and in the State of Washington is "at will" employment.' "At will"
means that an employee can be dismissed, or can quit, at any time and
for any reason.' Anti-discrimination laws modify the "at will"

employment rule by prohibiting employers from discriminating against
employees on the basis of particular enumerated grounds." Antidiscrimination laws do not protect against employment decisions based
on any classification; only clearly defined suspect classifications are

protected. For example, action based upon a racial stereotype is
proscribed in Washington, 2 but action based upon a person's astrological
sign is not.
Federal law does not explicitly prohibit employment discrimination on
the basis of marital status.' 3 It does, however, prohibit discrimination
based on sex, and suits against employers with policies discriminating on
the basis of marital status have been brought successfully on the basis of
gender discrimination. 4 To prevail in such an action, disparate treatment

9. Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 891,568 P.2d 764, 767 (1977).
10. 1 Mark A. Rothstein et al., Employment Law § 1A (1994).
11. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination by an employer on the grounds
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1994). Age and disability discrimination are also prohibited by federal legislation. See
Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994); Americans with Disabilities
Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994). States have enacted various statutes covering additional
grounds of discrimination such as marital status, pregnancy, and parenthood. E.g., Alaska Stat.
§ 18.80.220 (Michie 1996). Washington's employment anti-discrimination law protects against
discrimination on the grounds of "age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the
presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained guide dog or service
dog by a disabled person." Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
12. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
14. Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 864
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that airline that restricted employment of married female cabin attendants,
but not married male cabin attendants, had discriminated on basis of sex in violation of Title VI);
see also Lansdale v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 430 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that
complaint alleging that union caused airline employer to permit male, but not female, employees to
marry stated claim of sex discrimination under Title VII).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 73:135, 1998

of " or disparate impact upon16 either gender must be shown.'7 Federal
law therefore limits the relief it affords for marital status discrimination; if both married men and married women are equally subject
to discrimination, no remedy is available.'" Many states, including
Washington, have therefore enacted legislation prohibiting discrimination by employers on the ground of marital status.' 9
Courts in states with such statutes have not been uniform in their
interpretation of the term "marital status."2' Some courts have construed
the term narrowly, holding that it means nothing more than the status of

being married, single, widowed, or divorced.2 One reason for such a
15. Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 524 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that employer's requirement that
female employees sign forms endorsing name change reflecting their husbands' surnames
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII); see also Sangster, 438 F. Supp. at 1225;
Lansdale,430 F.2d at 1342.
16. See EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 331-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
employer's prohibition against hiring spouses of employees had disparate impact upon women and
was not justified by business necessity); cf Yuhas v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.
1977) (holding that employer's prohibition against hiring spouses of employees had statisticallyproven discriminatory impact on women, but nevertheless finding that employer's policy was jobrelated and so did not violate Title VI).
17. For an analysis of cases involving marital status discrimination brought under Title VII, see
Joyce D. Edelman, Comment, Marital Status Discrimination:A Survey of Federal Caselaw, 85
W. Va. L. Rev. 347 (1983).
18. "If Vassar [the employer] was as unlikely to promote married men as it was to promote
married women, then the only thing one could say is that Vassar discriminated against married
people. But marital status alone is not a ground for bringing a suit under Title VII." Fisher v. Vassar
College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1447 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that because married female plaintiff was
unable to show that Vassar College treated married female employees differently from married male
employees, college had not discriminated against her by denying tenure), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d
Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3472 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1998) (No. 97-404).
19. Alaska Stat. § 18.80.220(1) (Michie 1996); Cal. Gov't Code § 12940 (West 1992 & Supp.
1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-60(a)(1) (West 1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 711 (1995); D.C.
Code Ann. § 1-2512 (1992 & Supp. 1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 760.10 (West 1997); Haw. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 378-2 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-103(Q) (West 1993 &
Supp. 1997); Md. Ann. Code of 1957 art. 49B § 16 (1994); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.2202
(West 1985 & Supp. 1997); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 49-2-303 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48-1104 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 354-A:7 (1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296
(McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-03 (1991 & Supp. 1997); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 659.030 (1995); Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-716 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 49.60.180 (1996 & Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.321 (West 1997); cf Colo.Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 24-34-402(h) (West 1990) (prohibiting discrimination against employees or potential employees
on basis of marriage or engagement to another employee).
20. See Stephen B. Humphress, Note, State ProtectionAgainst MaritalStatus Discriminationby
Employers, 31 U. Louisville I. Fano. L. 919 (1992-93) (summarizing laws against marital status
discrimination in different states).
21. See, e.g., Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 791 (Alaska 1996); Boaden v.
Department of Law Enforcement, 664 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Il1. 1996); Whirlpool Corp. v. Michigan Civil
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narrow construction is that where the statute does not define marital
status, the term should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.'
Determining the scope of the term has most commonly been an issue in
cases involving an employer's anti-nepotism policies that resulted in

termination of, discrimination against, or refusal to hire an employee's
spouse.' Under the narrow interpretation of marital status, such policies
do not amount to unlawful marital status discrimination.
Other courts have interpreted marital status broadly, to encompass the
identity, occupation, and actions of a person's spouse,24 despite the fact
that the legislation under consideration provided either an ex facie
narrow definition s or no definition at all.26 These courts have focused on
the broad purposes of the statutes in question. For example, Thompson v.
Board of Trustees involved a school board policy that prohibited an

employee from having a spouse who was also employed by the school
board.27 The Supreme Court of Montana adopted a broad interpretation
of marital status "with a view ... to promote justice," and stated that a
narrow interpretation of the term "could lead to... [the] absurd result"
that both parties could remain employed simply by getting a divorce. 8 In

this case, the plaintiffs were school administrators who were married to
school teachers. One was fired and the other demoted after the school
board enacted its no-spouse policy. The court held that the employer's

Rights Comm'n, 390 NAV.2d 625, 626 (Mich. 1986); Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 362 N.W.2d 650,
654 (Mich. 1984); Thomson v. Sanbom's Motor Express, Inc., 382 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977); Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 415 N.E.2d
950, 953 (N.Y. 1980); Townshend v. Board of Educ., 396 S.E.2d 185, 189 (V. Va. 1990).
22. See, e.g., Manhattan Pizza Hut, 415 N.E.2d at 953 ("TIhe plain and ordinary meaning of
'marital status' is the social condition enjoyed by an individual by reason of his or her having
participated or failed to participate in a marriage."); cf Miller, 362 N.W.2d at 654 ("By including
marital status as a protected class, the Legislature manifested its intent to prohibit discrimination
based on whethera person is married.').
23. E.g., Boaden, 664 N.E.2d at 64 (holding that two state police troopers who married and were
subject to state police policy prohibiting spouses from working same shift had not been
discriminated against on basis of marital status).
24. Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai'i) Ltd., 879 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Haw. 1994); Thompson v.
Board of Trustees, 627 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Mont 1981).
25. Ross, 879 P.2d at 1041. The statute in Hawai'i defines marital status as "the state of being
married or being single." Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 378-1 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997).
26. Thompson, 627 P.2d at 1231.
27. The policy stated that "all school administrators of the Harlem Public Schools shall not have a
spouse employed in any capacity in the Harlem school system." Id. at 1230. This policy not only
prohibited the employer from hiring the spouse of an employee, but also prevented two employees
from marrying each other. Id.
28. Id. at 1231.
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actions created a cause of action for marital status discrimination under
the Montana statute.29

Minnesota is the only state with a statute that explicitly defines marital
status broadly.3" The definition provides that protection from marital
status discrimination includes, "in employment cases,.. . protection
against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or
beliefs of a spouse or former spouse."3' 1
Commentators have written extensively about marital status
discrimination, both in the context of housing3 2 and employers' antinepotism policies.33 In both these contexts, commentators have argued

that marital status discrimination should be applied broadly.34 Few
authors favor a narrow interpretation of marital status discrimination.35

29. Id. at 1232. The court was considering Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-303(l)(a) and § 49-3-201(1).
Id. at 1230.
30. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.01(24) (West 1991 & Supp. 1997).
31. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.01(24). The legislature added this definition in 1988, following the
Minnesota Supreme Court's refusal to interpret the term "marital status" to include the actions of a
job applicant's spouse. Cybyske v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn.
1984). The Minnesota Supreme Court had previously held that marital status included the "identity
or situation" of ajob applicant's spouse. Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979).
32. E.g., Robert C. Mueller, Note, Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission:
A Free Exercise Defense to Marital Status Discrimination?,74 B.U. L. Rev. 145 (1994); Donna
Bailey, Case Note, 17 Win. Mitchell L. Rev. 563 (1991); Recent Case, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 763
(1995); Seth H. Salinger & Neil D. Warrenbrand, Does a Sincerely Held Religious BeliefProvide a
Right to Discriminate?,39 Boston B.J. 5 (1995).
33. E.g., Douglas Massengill & Donald J. Petersen, Legal Challenges to No FraternizationRules,
46 Lab. L.L 429, 430 (1995); Julius M. Steiner & Steven P. Steinberg, CaughtBetween Scylla and
Charybdis:Are Antinepotism PoliciesBenign Paternalism or Covert Discrimination?,20 Employee
Relations L.J. 253 (1994); Dennis Alerding, Note, The Family That Works Together... Can 't: NoSpouse Rules as Marital Status Discrimination Under State and FederalLaw, 32 U. Louisville J.
Fam. L. 867 (1994); Anna Giattina, Note, ChallengingNo-Spouse Employment Policies as Marital
Status Discrimination:A BalancingApproach, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1111 (1987).
34. Giattina, supra note 33, at 1130-31 (employing broad definition of marital status to argue that
employers' "no spouse" policies should be struck down); Mueller, supra note 32, at 146 (arguing
that prohibition of marital status discrimination in housing should be read broadly to apply to
cohabiting unmarried couples). Alerding, supra note 33, at 883, even recommends amending Title
VII to include marital status.
35. But see John-Edward Alley, Marital Status Discrimination:An Amorphous Prohibition,54
Fla. B.J. 217, 221 (1980) (concluding that "the [Florida] Commission [on Human Relations] should
be hesitant to expand the definition of 'marital status' beyond its plain and ordinary meaning").

Marital Status Discrimination
B.

The Development of the Law Against MaritalStatus Discrimination
in Washington
When Washington's Law Against Discrimination ' was first enacted

in 1949, it only prohibited discrimination on the basis of "race, creed,
color or national origin."37 Over time, this law was revised to prohibit
discrimination based on other characteristics such as sex, age, and
physical handicap.38 In 1973, Washington's legislature amended the
statute to prohibit discrimination on the ground of marital status,

whereby it became an unfair practice for an employer to refuse to hire,
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against a person based on marital
status.39 Although the change did not include a definition of the term
"marital status," the statute mandated that its provisions "shall be
construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof."4

Two years after the addition of marital status to Washington's antidiscrimination law, the Washington State Human Rights Commission
defined marital status discrimination in detail in regulations
implementing the statute.4" The Commission adopted a broad definition
of marital status discrimination, identifying three situations in which
such discrimination could occur: "In general, discrimination against an

employee or applicant for employment because of (a) what a person's
marital status is; (b) who his or her spouse is; or (c) what the spouse

36. Wash. Rev. Code ch.49.60 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
37. Law Against Discrimination in Employment, cl. 183, §1, 1949 Wash. Laws 506, 506.
38. See Law Against Discrimination, ch. 37, § 1, 1957 Wash. Laws 107, 107; Law Against
Discrimination, ch. 167, § 1, 1969 Wash. Laws 1171, 1171; Law Against Discrimination, ch. 141,
§ 1, 1973 Wash. Laws 418, 419; Law Against Discrimination, ch. 214, § 1, 1973 Wash. Laws 1648,
1648; Law Against Discrimination, ch. 185, § 1, 1985 Wash. Laws 684, 684; Law Against
Discrimination, ch. 510, § 1, 1993 Wash. Laws 2331,2331.
The current version addresses discrimination on the basis of "race, creed, color, national origin,
families with children, sex, marital status, age, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical
disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a disabled person." Wash. Rev. Code
§ 49.60.010.
39. Law Against Discrimination, ch. 141, § 10, 1973 Wash. Laws at 424 (codified as amended at
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(1)-(3)).
40. Law Against Discrimination ch. 141, § 2, 1973 Wash. Laws at 419 (codified as amended at
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020). See generallyPhillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wash. 2d 903, 908, 766
P.2d 1099, 1102 (1989) ("fl1he statutory protections against discrimination are to be liberally
construed and its exceptions narrowly confined.").
41. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150 (1997).
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does, is an unfair practice because the action is based on the person's
'
marital status."42
The breadth of this definition is substantially mitigated by an
exception in the regulations for "business necessity," defined as
"circumstances where an employer's actions are based upon a
compelling and essential need to avoid business-related conflicts of
interest, or to avoid the reality or appearance of improper influence or
favor."43
In 1978, the Washington Supreme Court examined and upheld the
Human Rights Commission's broad definition of marital status in
Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights
Commission.' In this case, the court reviewed a declaratory judgment
that the regulation's broad definition of marital status was ultra vires.
The court reversed the judgment and held that the Commission did not
exceed its statutory authority with its definition of marital status
discrimination.4" The court took a broad view of the discrimination
statute, construing the relevant provisions in light of the statute's purpose

42. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(2). The regulations also provide examples of actions that
would constitute unfair practices amounting to marital status discrimination:
(i) Refusal to hire a person because her or his spouse has a job and is "making good money."
(ii) Refusal to hire a person because his or her spouse is already employed by the same
employer, except for particular positions where business necessity requires exclusion of
relatives, consistently with this section. (iii) Discharge of a person because he or she has married
another employee of the same employer, unless the spouses occupy positions where business
necessity requires the exclusion of relatives, consistent with this regulation, and neither spouse
can be transferred to a position where the business necessity reason doesn't apply.
Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(3)(a)(i)-(iii).
43. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(2). The regulations provide examples of situations in
which the business necessity exception will operate:
(i) Where one spouse would have the authority or practical power to supervise, appoint, remove,
or discipline the other;, (ii) Where one spouse would be responsible for auditing the work of the
other, (iii) Where other circumstances exist which would place the spouses in a situation of
actual or reasonably foreseeable conflict between the employer's interest and their own; (iv)
Where, in order to avoid the reality or appearance of improper influence or favor, or to protect
its confidentiality, the employer must limit the employment of close relatives of policy level
officers of customers, competitors, regulatory agencies, or others with whom the employer
deals.
Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(3)(b)(i)-(iv).
44. 91 Wash. 2d 62,586 P.2d 1149 (1978).
45. Id. at 69-70, 586 P.2d at 1153-54; see also Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.120(3) (1996 & Supp.
1997) (providing that Commission may promulgate rles and regulations to implement antidiscrimination law); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.110 (1996) (providing that Commission can
formulate policies to give effect to anti-discrimination law).

Marital Status Discrimination
when viewed as a whole." The court found that, in the absence of a
statutory definition, the legislature had given the Commission the power
to define circumstances constituting marital status discrimination. 4"
Washington Water Power appeared to settle the issue of whether

Washington's Law Against Discrimination defined marital status to
include the identity of an employee's spouse. Subsequent Washington
courts interpreted the law against marital status discrimination liberally.48
Indeed, commentators frequently cited Washington Water Power as

placing Washington in the group of states adopting a broad interpretation
of marital status.4 9
C.

The 1993 Amendment

1.

The Passageof the 1993 Amendment to Washington's AntiDiscriminationLaw

In 1993, the Washington legislature amended the law against
discrimination to define marital status as "the legal status of being
46. The court, per Justice Rosellini, stated that "[w]hen read in the light of the entire statute, the
provision which makes it an unfair practice to refuse to hire any person 'because of such
person's ... marital status' is broad enough in its import to cover the... [anti-nepotism policies)
here." Washington WaterPower,91 Wash. 2d at 69,586 P.2d at 1154.
47. Id at 68, 586 P.2d at 1153. The court stated:
The fact that the commission was given broad policy formulation and rule-making powers
indicates a legislative recognition that all of the circumstances in which discrimination might
exist and all of the forms which it might take were not then known and could not be anticipated,
and that the diligence and expertise of an administrative agency were needed to achieve the
purpose intended in the statute.
Id. at 69, 586 P.2d at 1153.
48. Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash. 2d 483, 488, 859 P.2d 26, 29
(1993) ("The meaning of marital status as used in RCW 49.60.180 is not limited to conditions such
as being married, single, or divorced, but also applies to antinepotism policies based on the identity
of an employee's spouse."); modified, 122 Wash. 2d 483, 865 P.2d 507 (1994); Waggoner v. Ace
Hardware Corp., 84 Wash. App. 210, 927 P.2d 251 (1996) (holding that discrimination against
employees because of dating relationship is prohibited by Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180), review
granted,132 Wash. 2d 1001, 939 P.2d 216 (June 3, 1997) (No. 65079-9); cf.Loveland v. Leslie, 21
Wash. App. 84, 583 P.2d 664 (1978) (affirming finding that landlord's policy of renting only to
married couples constituted marital status discrimination). But see McFadden v. Elma Country Club,
26 Wash. App. 195, 613 P.2d 146 (1980) (finding that refusal by country club to permit unmarried
couple to buy house on club's property was not marital status discrimination).
49. E.g., Steiner & Steinberg, supra note 33, at 259; Alerding, supra note 33, at 876; Edelman,
supra note 17, at 361; Giattina, supra note 33, at 1119; Humphress, supra note 20, at 930; John P.
Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, 'No-Spouse' and Anti-Nepotism Policies,N.Y. L., Feb. 3, 1995, at
3, 9; Lawrence A. Michaels & Tracy L. Thornburg, Although Employers'Restrictions on
Relationships Between Employees Can Give Rise to Claims, Some Restraints on Office Romances
May Withstand Challenge,Nat'l L.L, Apr. 1, 1996, at B5.
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married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed."5' Senate Bill 5474,
which included this amendment, was sponsored by several senators at the
request of the Washington State Human Rights Commission. The bill
included numerous other amendments to Washington's antidiscrimination. laws,5' and as a result, the legislative history of Senate
Bill 5474 does not mention the new definition of marital status.52 When
the bill was passed, however, Governor Mike Lowry stated that "Senate
Bill No. 5474 strengthens the penalties available to the Human Rights
Commission for civil rights violations" and that he "strongly support[ed]
the bill's direction in this, as well as a number of technical clean up
provisions."53
2.

Kastanis and Magula: The Impact of the 1993 Amendment Remains
an Open Question

Shortly after the 1993 amendment to Washington's antidiscrimination law became effective, the Supreme Court of Washington

considered the definition of marital status discrimination. In Kastanis v.
Educational Employees Credit Union,54 an employee claimed that she
was discriminated against when she was discharged after marrying the
CEO of her corporate employer.5" The court, however, did not consider
the 1993 amendment because both parties accepted the Washington
Administrative Code's broad definition of marital status. 6 Using the
regulations' broad definition and the business necessity exception, the

50. Law Against Discrimination, ch. 510, § 4, 1993 Wash. Laws 2331,2334 (codified as amended
at Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(7) (1996 & Supp. 1997)). The 1993 amendment became effective
on July 25, 1993.
51. 1 Legislative Digest & History of Bills of the Senate and House of Representatives, 53d Legis.
212 (Wash. 1993-94).
52. 1993 Wash. Senate Journal, Regular Sess. 2163-64,2180,2267,2268,2279; House Judiciary
Committee, Tape H-53-JUD-32b, side 1 (Apr. 2, 1993).
53. Governor Lowry made this statement in a letter explaining his partial veto of Senate Bill 5474.
1 Legislative Digest & History of Bills of the Senate and House of Representatives, at 212.
54. 122 Wash. 2d 483, 859 P.2d 26 (1993), modified, 122 Wash. 2d 483, 865 P.2d 507 (1994).
55. Id.at 487, 859 P.2d at 28. A jury found discrimination on the basis of marital status and
awarded damages to the plaintiff. Id. The court of appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court of
Washington under Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.030. Id. at 488, 859 P.2d at 29. The supreme court
reversed. Id. at 502, 859 P.2d at 36.
56. "This version of the statute [incorporating the 1993 amendment] is not before us." Id. at 488
n.2, 865 P.2d at 507 n.2. "Although both parties addressed WAC 162-16-150 in their briefs, neither
party challenged the regulation. Accordingly we assume, but do not decide, that the regulation
properly states the law to be applied in this case." Id. at 492, 865 P.2d at 507 n.4.
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court found that in such cases business necessity is not an affirmative
defense."
The Supreme Court of Washington again considered the definition of
marital status in Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co. 8 and again
declined to examine the effect of the 1993 amendment. 9 The plaintiff in
Magula was terminated following allegations that her husband, an
independent contractor for her employer, harassed other employees.' For
the first time, the court considered briefs addressing the meaning of the
1993 amendment and whether it narrowed the definition of marital status
discrimination to exclude discrimination based on the actions of an
employee's spouse. 61 However, the court did not decide the meaning of
the 1993 amendment because the plaintiff was discharged before the
amendment became effective.62 The majority, per Justice Talmadge,
stated that the 1993 amendment should not be applied retroactively
because "if the change is substantive, the general rule of prospective
application applies; if the change is merely curative, prior Washington
law is unaffected."'63
Kastanis and Magula therefore shed little light upon the interpretation
of the 1993 amendment. It is still unclear how the Supreme Court of
Washington will interpret the term "marital status" in future cases.

57. Id. at 492-93, 859 P.2d at 31-32; see also infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
58. 131 Wash. 2d 171,930 P.2d 307 (1997).
59. The majority stated that "[w]hile the 1993 amendment to RCW 49.60.040... may alter the
administrative definition of WAC 162-16-150, that issue is not now before us." Id. at 181, 930 P.2d
at 312 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 174-75, 930 P.2d at 309.
61. In contrast to Kastanis, the court stated that "the parties have focused solely on the definition
of 'marital status'; Magula [the plaintiff] has not addressed, nor has BFT [the defendant] argued at
this point in the case, whether Magula's termination was a 'business necessity."' Id. at 176-77, 930
P.2d at 3 10.
62. The court therefore based its decision in Magula upon the definition in the regulations that
was approved in Washington Water Power. Id. at 181, 930 P.2d at 312 (citing Washington Water
Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978)).
The majority in Magula held that the facts of the case could give rise to a claim of marital status
discrimination under the Commission's regulations and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Id. at 184, 930 P.2d at 314.
63. Id at 182, 930 P.2d at 313. In a separate concurrence, Justice Alexander stated: "I... agree
with the majority that the 1993 amendment may not be given retroactive effect." Id. at 185, 930 P.2d
at 314 (Alexander, J., concurring).
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The Dissent in Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co.

Justice Sanders is the only member of the supreme court to have
expressed an opinion on the meaning of the 1993 amendment to
Washington's anti-discrimination law.' He directly addressed this issue
in his dissent in Magula, s finding that the 1993 amendment clarified

existing law by defining marital status narrowly, to exclude the identity
and actions of an employee's spouse.'
The dissent in Magula relied on an insurance case, Edwards v.
Farmers Insurance Co.,67 to show that, before the 1993 amendment, the
meaning of marital status was "ambiguous at best."68 Although Edwards
involved an insurance statute69 and did not expressly consider the issue
of employment discrimination, the dissent in Magula interpreted
Edwards as having "specifically adopted the holding of [the Minnesota
Supreme Court] ... that an employer's refusal to hire because of the
views of an applicant's spouse did not constitute marital discrimination

64. Justice Madsen signed on to Justice Sanders' dissent. Id. at 191,930 P.2d at 318.
65. Id.at 185-91,930 P.2d at 315-18 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
66. Id.at 186-87, 930 P.2d at 315 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
67. 111 Wash. 2d 710, 763 P.2d 1226 (1988). The dispute in Edwards involved a car accident in
which Kenneth Edwards was killed by an uninsured motorist At the time, Mr. Edwards was driving
a truck that was insured by the defendant, Farmers Insurance Company. The named insured for the
truck was Mr. Edwards' wife, Louise. Mr. Edwards was the named insured in another policy issued
by the defendant that related to a different vehicle. Both policies provided for underinsured motorist
protection and both covered Mr. Edwards as an insured person. Id. at 712 & n.1, 763 P.2d at 1227 &
n.1. The estate of Mr. Edwards attempted to recover under both policies, but the defendant refused to
pay under Mr. Edwards' own policy. The defendant argued that the terms of the policy prevented
double recovery where the second insurance policy was issued to the spouse of the named insured
who lived in the same house ("external stacking"). Id. at 713-15, 763 P.2d at 1228-29.
68. Magula, 131 Wash. 2d at 191, 930 P.2d at 317 (Sanders, J., dissenting). The majority of the
court in Magula disagreed with the dissent's interpretation of Edwards.Id. at 181,930 P.2d at 312.
69. Wash. Rev. Code § 48.30.300 (1996) provides:
The amount of [insurance] benefits payable, or any term, rate, condition, or type of coverage
shall not be restricted, modified, excluded, increased or reduced on the basis of sex or marital
status .... Mhese provisions shall not prohibit fair discrimination on the basis of sex, or
marital status ... when bona fide statistical differences in risk or exposure have been
substantiated.
The issue for the court in Edwards was whether the relevant provision in Mr. Edwards' insurance
policy constituted discrimination on the basis of marital status under Wash. Rev. Code § 48.30.300.
The court held that the provision in the insurance policy did amount to marital status discrimination
and remanded the case for a determination of whether there were any "bona fide statistical
differences in risk or exposure" in terms of Wash. Rev. Code § 48.30.300. Edwards, 111 Wash. 2d at
720, 763 P.2d at 1231.
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because it was not directed at the institution of marriage itself."70 The
dissent concluded that Edwards was therefore at odds with the broad
definition of marital status in the Washington regulations, 7' and that the
legislature deliberately passed the 1993 amendment to clarify this
ambiguity. 72 According to the dissent, the 1993 amendment indicated
that the legislature originally intended to interpret marital status
narrowly.73 Thus, the dissent found the definition of marital status in the

1993 amendment was clear: its plain meaning did not include the identity
or actions of a person's spouse.74
The dissent then argued that even if the 1993 amendment were
ambiguous, marital status should be construed narrowly. 7 First, it
examined legislative history, but considered only the history of House

Bill 404,76 which amended Washington's law in 1973 to include the term
marital status in the anti-discrimination statute. The dissent made no
reference to the legislative history of Senate Bill 5474,77 which
introduced the 1993 amendment defining marital status. Second,
asserting that the purpose of anti-discrimination statutes is to prevent
discrimination based upon stereotypes,78 the dissent concluded that the
plaintiff in Magula had not been discriminated against because her
termination was predicated upon facts specific to her, rather than a
stereotypical view of a class of people.79 "While being married is a classdefining factor, being married to Pat Magula [the plaintiffs husband] is
70. Magulda, 131 Wash. 2d at 191, 930 P.2d at 317 (Sanders J., dissenting) (citing Cybyske v.
Independent Sch. Dist. No. 196,347 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1984)).
71. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150 (1997); see also supra notes 41-43 and accompanying
text.
72. The dissent stated that the 1993 amendment "was meant to clarify an uncertainty rather than
change existing law." Magula, 131 Wash. 2d at 191, 930 P.2d at 317 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
73. "This amendment was a legislative instruction clarifying what that body meant from the
beginning. Through this enactment the Legislature merely restated its original intent." Id. at 192, 930
P.2d at 317-18 (Sanders, ., dissenting).
74. Id at 187, 930 P.2d at 315 (Sanders, J., dissenting) ("The plain and ordinary meaning of the
term 'marital status' clearly does not encompass the identity of one's spouse.").
75. The dissent concluded that there was "no indication whatsoever that the Legislature ever
intended such a bizarre definition as the majority would impose." Id (Sanders, J., dissenting).
76. H.B. 404, 43d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1973).
77. S.B. 5474, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1993).
78. "Confining the definition of marital status to the condition of being married or unmarried best
serves the purpose of this state's antidiscrimination laws because it confines the statute's focus to
preventing offensive and demeaning stereotypes." Magula, 131 Wash. 2d at 189, 930 P.2d at 316
(Sanders, 3., dissenting).
79. "The reasons for the plaintiff's dismissal are wholly unique to her." Id (Sanders, L,
dissenting).
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not.... The majority's highly personalized reading of the statute
therefore runs contrary to the goals embodied in our antidiscrimination
laws.""0 Therefore, the dissent interpreted the 1993 amendment as an
assertion that marital status should be narrowly defined."
Implicit in the Magula dissent is the concern that a narrow
interpretation of marital status is necessary to protect Washington's
tradition of "at will" employment82 and the policy of freedom of contract
that it serves. This argument assumes that a broad interpretation of

marital status would deny employers the flexibility they need to make
sound employment decisions based upon legitimate financial and
business concerns.
II.

WASHINGTON STATE SHOULD CONTINUE TO INTERPRET
MARITAL STATUS BROADLY

The dissent in Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co. s' misreads
Washington's anti-discrimination statute and is misguided as a matter of
policy. As Washington courts have recognized since 1978, protection
from discrimination based on the identity or actions of an employee's

spouse is an important component of anti-discrimination legislation.85
The 1993 amendment to Washington's anti-discrimination statute does
not, by its own terms, remove this long-established protection, and the
legislative history to the amendment does not indicate that it was
intended to do so. Part A of this analysis explains how protection from
marital status discrimination fits into the framework of anti-

80. Id. (Sanders, J., dissenting).
81. In forceful language, the dissent chastised the majority for disregarding the will of the
democratically elected legislature:
This court should refrain from rewriting legislation to reflect personal policy preferences of the
individual justices. The decision ignores the plain meaning of words. The majority's decision
casts aside the reasoned decision of the people's elected representatives in favor of its own. The
majority's decision shows little respect for our Legislature and even less for the people that
elected it.
Id. at 192, 930 P.2d at 318 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
82. See Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 891, 568 P.2d 764, 767 (1977) ("In
Washington an employer has the right to discharge an employee, with or without cause, in the
absence of a contract for a specified period of time.").
83. Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 109 Wash. 2d 747, 757, 748 P.2d 621, 627 (1988) ("In the
absence ofunconscionability or illegality, the law requires enforcement of a contract as written.").
84. 131 Wash. 2d 171, 185-92,930 P.2d 307, 315-18 (1997) (Sanders, J., dissenting).
85. Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62,
586 P.2d 1149 (1978); see also supranotes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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discrimination legislation generally and provides several policy
arguments in support of this protection. Part B considers the 1993
amendment to Washington's anti-discrimination statute and its
legislative history, establishing that a broad definition of marital status is
consistent with both.
A.

A BroadDefinition ofMaritalStatus Is Compelled by AntiDiscriminationPolicy

There are at least three policy arguments supporting a broad reading
of marital status in Washington's anti-discrimination legislation. First, a
broad interpretation of marital status is necessary to protect employees
from undesirable stereotyping, particularly the stereotype that spouses
are not autonomous. Second, marital status must be interpreted broadly
to implement Washington's public policy encouraging marriage. Third, a
broad interpretation of marital status, coupled with a defense of business
necessity, properly balances the interests of employees and employers.
1.

A BroadInterpretationofMaritalStatus is Necessary To Prohibit
DiscriminationBased on the Stereotype that Spouses Are Not
Autonomous

Anti-discrimination laws modify the "at will" employment doctrine to
prevent employers from making decisions that are based on certain
classifications. The employee classifications protected by antidiscrimination laws identify characteristics such as race, religion, and
marital status that often form the basis of irrational prejudice and
stereotyping. Anti-discrimination laws therefore protect against the threat
that an employer will make a decision based on prejudice about a group
rather than based on the merits of an individual.
The adverse treatment of an employee based solely upon a stereotype
conflicts with the core American values of individualism and the belief
that everyone should succeed or fail on his or her own merit.16 If
stereotypes serve as the determining factor in the evaluation of an
employee or a potential employee, then that employee is being neither

86. "The American Revolution transformed the social landscape from a world that emphasized
hierarchy and communal goals, to a world marked by equality and individualism .... Paul A. Gilje,
The Rise of Capitalism in the Early Republic, 16 J. Early Republic 159, 178 (1996); cf. Gina M.
Shkodriani & Judith L. Gibbons, Individualism and Collectivism Among University Students in
Mexico and the UnitedStates, 135 J. Soc. Psychol. 765, 766 (1995) (finding that students in United
States are more individualistic than students in Mexico).
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treated as an individual nor assessed on the basis of his or her own
merit." The action of stereotyping a person denies that person his or her
own individuality.8 Keeping this general framework in mind, the choice
between the broad and the narrow interpretations of marital status raises
two questions. Does an adverse employment decision based on the
identity or actions of an employee's spouse amount to stereotyping? If
so, is this a form of stereotyping that is prohibited by Washington's law
against marital status discrimination?
The dissent in Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co. answered the first
of these questions in the negative 9 and avoided reaching the second. The
dissent's argument turned on the denial of the plaintiff's status as a
member of a protected class for the purposes of her claim. The dissent
reasoned that because the actions of the plaintiffs husband were
particular to him and therefore particular to the plaintiff, the plaintiff
could not be suffering from discrimination based upon her membership
in a protected class, and therefore should not be protected by the statute
against marital status discrimination.90
This argument ignores the reality that every marital relationship
includes both particular and general elements.9 ' The problem posed by
discrimination claims based on the actions or identity of an employee's
spouse is whether the court should focus onfacts about the spouse, or on
the marital link from those facts to the employee.92 By considering only
the first of these, the dissent ignored the marital relationship as an
essential element in such claims; the bond of marriage operates as a
bridge from the actions or identity of a spouse to an employer's
detrimental decision relating to the employee. In contrast to the dissent's
narrow interpretation of marital status, a broad reading takes this link
87. One commentator raises a concern about stereotyping in her argument that "no spouse"
policies should be struck down. She states that "[c]ourts should not permit employers to base
employment decisions on stereotypes regarding a married person's ability to perform when a spouse
works in the same company for the same reason employers are not permitted to base employment
decisions on stereotypes regarding race or sex." Giattina, supra note 33, at 1128.
88. See generally Stereotypingand Prejudice: Changing Conceptions (Daniel Bar-Tal et al. eds.,
1989) (analyzing stereotyping and prejudice resulting from person's membership in group).
89. Magula, 131 Wash. 2d at 188-89,930 P.2d at 316 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
90. See supra notes 80-80 and accompanying text.
91. The Hawai'i Supreme Court has stated that "[o]ne does not 'marry' in some generic sense, but
marries a specific person. Thus, the 'identity' of one's spouse (and all of his or her attributes,
including his or her occupation) is implicitly subsumed within the definition of 'being married.' The
two cannot be separated." Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai'i), 879 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Haw. 1994).
92. Business necessity considerations are the proper place for a focus on the particular facts about
the employee's spouse. See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text
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into account and acknowledges that a judgment branding an employee
with the characteristics of his or her spouse is itself a potentially harmful
stereotype based on marriage.93
In fact, employment decisions based on the identity or actions of an
employee's spouse may involve a particularly invidious form of
discrimination. The employee's individuality is denied not simply by the
process of stereotyping, but also by the operation of a stereotype that
itself assumes an absence of autonomy: employees are defined and
judged not by any characteristics of their own, but by facts about their
spouses. This double denial of the employee's autonomy underscores the
importance of maintaining a broad definition of marital status.
The Acme hypothetical at the beginning of this Comment illustrates
this point. In the hypothetical, the employer determines that the
accusations against Sandy's spouse reflect on Sandy's suitability for the
job, regardless of the fact that Sandy, the employee, was accused of no
wrongdoing. Acme views Sandy as inseparable from her spouse, and
Sandy's autonomy is denied. 4 The detrimental effects of this stereotype
can only be tackled by affording the term "marital status" a broad
interpretation.
2.

The Public PolicyEncouragingMarriageRequires a Broad
Interpretationof MaritalStatus

It may seem illogical for an employee whose spouse has an
undesirable trait to be protected from discrimination, while another
employee who merely chooses to associate with an undesirable person as
a friend or companion would not be protected. This discrepancy is
justified because marital relationships should receive greater protection
than other relationships. A marriage cannot be broken off as easily as a
friendship. Once two people have made the initial choice to enter the
legal and social relationship of marriage, they cannot subsequently
choose to disassociate themselves from their spouse without effecting a
legal dissolution. The special protection afforded to spouses by marital

93. Edelman argues for a broad interpretation of marital status on the ground that everyone should
be judged according to his or her own merit. She states: "If future no-spouse cases do not analyze
'marital status' in this [broad] fashion [to include the identity and occupation of one's spouse], these
state statutes must be relegated to the list of inadequate remedies." Edelman, supra note 17, at 362.
94. In Washington Water Power,the court noted that anti-nepotism policies operate "without any
consideration being given to the actual effect of the marital relationship upon the individual's
qualifications or work performance." Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington Human Rights
Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62,64,586 P.2d 1149, 1151 (1978).
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status anti-discrimination provisions therefore accords with Washington's long-settled public policy of protecting the institution of
marriage.95 The Supreme Court of Washington has indicated that
"divorce is against sound public policy, and statutes should not be

construed so as to encourage divorce if such construction can reasonably
be avoided."96
Washington's public policy encouraging marriage supports a broad
interpretation of marital status anti-discrimination provisions. Consider
the Acme hypothetical at the beginning of this Comment. Sandy has
suffered from marital status discrimination in the broad sense: Acme
terminated Sandy because she failed to divorce her spouse. Some
employees in Sandy's situation might prefer to get divorced rather than
lose their jobs. In either case, the public policy supporting marriage
encourages protection of employees from such decisions.
3.

The Business Necessity Defense Ensures that Employers' Interests
Are Protectedin MaritalStatus DiscriminationCases.

A broad definition of marital status discrimination does not preclude
the defense of business necessity.97 Washington's administrative
regulations specifically provide for this defense, stating that "there are

certain circumstances where business necessity may justify action on the
basis of what the spouse does."9" For example, the defendant in Magula
v. Benton Franklin Title Co. 99 could have argued that the harassment of
other employees by the plaintiff's spouse had made constructive working
relationships between the plaintiff and her co-workers impossible,
95. For example, Washington's rules of evidence clearly reflect a public policy in favor of
protecting marriage. See Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.060(1) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (providing that
communications between spouses during marriage are privileged for evidentiary purposes); see also
Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) ("The basis of the immunity given to
communications between husband and wife is the protection of marital confidences, regarded as so
essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the
administration ofjustice which the privilege entails."); State v. Wood, 52 Wash. App. 159, 163, 758
P.2d 530, 532 (1988) ("The marital [evidentiary] privileges are based on preserving the sanctity and
harmony of marriage....").
96. Christiansen v. Department of Soc. Sec., 15 Wash. 2d 465, 469, 131 P.2d 189, 192 (1942); cf.
Dille v. Dille, 64 Wash. 2d 856, 859, 394 P.2d 901, 903 (1964) ("We fully agree that underlying
public policy requires both courts and counsel to clear and lay aside all obstacles to the possible
reconciliation of estranged spouses, and when parties to a divorce action have settled their
differences the action should be dismissed without delay.").
97. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
98. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(2) (1997).
99. 131 Wash. 2d 171, 930 P.2d 307 (1997).
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therefore necessitating dismissal of the plaintiff for business reasons.' 0 A
broad definition of marital status coupled with a business necessity
defense, as set out in Washington's regulations, affords the possibility of
relief to plaintiffs who suffer discrimination based on an attribute of their
spouses, while allowing defendants to prove that their actions were
justified on business grounds. In this way, the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants are balanced.
The dissent in Magula inadvertently illustrates the role of business
necessity when it uses an example of a bank that fires the spouse of a
bank robber as proof that "the majority's definition goes well beyond
what the Legislature intended."'"' The bank robber hypothetical is
instructive, but it does not adequately justify the narrow definition of
marital status suggested by the dissent. The bank robber hypothetical
also differs in one important respect from the Acme hypothetical: the
bank has a clear business necessity supporting dismissal of the employee.
The bank should be able to protect information about its security systems
from getting into such dangerous hands.' 2 In the Acme hypothetical,
however, business necessity is lacking unless the charges of child sexual
abuse against the employee's spouse are somehow related to the
employee's position in the company. The regulations indicate that the
Human Rights Commission had a clear idea of the kinds of legitimate
business needs required for dismissing an employee on the ground of
marital status. 3 Examples identified by the Commission include a
situation in which one spouse supervises the other spouse,'O° and in
which circumstances exist placing "spouses in a situation of actual or
reasonably foreseeable conflict between the employer's interest and their
own."'0 5 Thus, the business necessity defense protects employers from

100. The trial court found evidence that the plaintiff's supervisor, Greg Bowers, was concerned
that the actions by the plaintiff's husband were making it difficult for the plaintiff and one of her coworkers to have a working relationship. Id. at 174-75, 930 P.2d at 309.
101. Id at 188, 930 P.2d at 316 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
102. It could be argued that the assumption the bank employee will divulge security information
to her spouse is itself an example of stereotyping spouses as lacking autonomy. See supra note 94
and accompanying text. However, the point of the business necessity defense is not to negate the
operation of such a stereotype, but to concede that in some circumstances such stereotyping is
warranted. In the example of the bank robber, it could be said that the threat to the bank's business
outweighs any adverse effects of the stereotyping.
103. In the regulations, the Commission set out examples of situations where business necessity
would be present. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(3)(b) (1997); see also supranote 43.
104. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(3)(b)(i).

105. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(3)(b)(iii).
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the excesses of the broad interpretation of marital status that troubled the
dissent in Magula.
The business necessity defense is especially protective of defendants
in Washington following the decision in Kastanis v. Educational
Employees Credit Union. 0 6 In Kastanis, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that business necessity is not an affirmative defense,
and that the burden remains with the plaintiff to prove that business
necessity is absent. °7 A plaintiff must not only prove that the action of
the employer was based upon the plaintiff's marital status; the plaintiff
must also prove there was no legitimate business reason for the action.'
This extra burden on the plaintiff in an employment discrimination action
acts as a sufficient counterbalance to a broad interpretation of marital
status. A proper balance between a plaintiff and a defendant does not
require a further restriction of the application of anti-discrimination laws
by adopting a narrow interpretation of marital status.
B.

The 1993 Amendment Does Not Preclude a BroadInterpretationof
MaritalStatus

1.

Washington Adopted a BroadInterpretationofMaritalStatus Prior
to the 1993 Amendment.

In Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights
Commission, °9 the Supreme Court of Washington ratified the broad
interpretation of marital status that had been promulgated by the
Washington Human Rights Commission."' The Magula dissent relied on
Edwards v. Farmers Insurance Co."' to show that the definition of
marital status was unclear in Washington prior to the 1993
amendment." 2 However, there are several reasons why Edwards does not
lead to that conclusion.

106. 122 Wash. 2d 483, 859 P.2d 26 (1993), modified, 122 Wash. 2d 483, 865 P.2d 507 (1994).
107. Id. at 492-93, 859 P.2d at 31-32.
108. Id. at 493, 859 P.2d at 32.
109. 91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978).
110. See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150 (1997).
111. 111 Wash. 2d 710, 763 P.2d 1226 (1988). For a description of Edwards and the Magula
dissent's interpretation of it, see supranotes 67-72 and accompanying text.
112. Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wash. 2d 170, 191, 930 P.2d 307, 317 (1997)
(Sanders, J., dissenting).
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Edwards interpreted a statutory provision dealing with insurance
policies."' In contrast, Magula dealt with the employment discrimination
statute." 4 Addressing the dissent's use of Edwards, the majority in
Magula noted that "[t]he parties in Edwards did not argue and the Court
did not consider the applicability of WAC 162-16-150. Thus, Edwards
has no effect whatsoever on the vitality of our holding in Washington
Water Power with respect to the regulation.""' Because the underlying
relationships and considerations in the insurance arena differ from those
pertaining to employment discrimination," 6 the dissent's attempt to read
the employment statute under the Edwards standard was properly
rejected by the majority in Magula."7

In addition, even if Edwards were relevant to the law on employment
discrimination, the Supreme Court of Washington clearly does not
consider Edwards to be at odds with the broad interpretation afforded to
the term marital status by Washington's administrative regulations. In

Kastanis, for example, the court not only broadly interpreted marital
status, but also cited Edwards as an additional source indicating support

of that position." 8
Therefore, a broad interpretation of marital status was firmly
established in Washington law prior to 1993. The Magula dissent's
attempt to create ambiguity in this area is unpersuasive.

113. Wash. Rev. Code § 48.30.300 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
114. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1996 & Supp. 1997); Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150.
115. Magula, 131 Wash. 2d at 181, 930 P.2d at 312.
116. Employment discrimination is likely to have an immediate impact on what is a crucial
relationship for most employees. Employment is, after all, the relationship upon which employees
depend for their very livings, and employees fiequently spend large portions of the day at their
places of work. In contrast, the relationship between the insured and insurer is more remote; it is
unusual for an insurance relationship to be a core relationship in the life of an insured. In fact, an
insured may never make a claim upon a policy.
117. Although laws against marital status discrimination in the areas of employment and
insurance may be somewhat analogous, they are distinct Edwards is clearly distinguishable from
cases such as Magula, Kastanis, and Washington Water Power, which all deal with marital status
discrimination in the context of an employment relationship. Edwards therefore does not affect the
clearly broad interpretation afforded to the term marital status in the context of employment
discrimination.
118. "The meaning of marital status as used in RCW 49.60.180 is not limited to conditions such
as being married, single, or divorced, but also applies to antinepotism policies based on the identity
of an employee's or applicant's spouse." Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union, 122
Wash. 2d 483,488, 859 P.2d 26, 29 (1993) (citing Edwards v. Farmers Ins. Co., 111 Wash. 2d 710,
718,763 P.2d 1226 (1988)), modified, 122 Wash. 2d 483, 865 P.2d 507 (1994).
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The 1993 Amendment to the Washington Anti-Discrimination
Statute Supports a BroadInterpretationofMaritalStatus

Although the Washington anti-discrimination statute has included a
prohibition on discrimination based on marital status since 1973,9
marital status was not defined in the statute until 1993. The 1993
amendment added the definition "the legal status of being married,
single, separated, divorced, or widowed."' 0 This definition should not be
read to narrow the types of decisions by employers that are deemed to be
"on account of marital status"; instead, the definition should be
interpreted as circumscribing the types of relationships that qualify for
protection under the statute. As long as one of the relationships listed in
the statute is at the root of a negative employment decision, then the
employee's claim for marital status discrimination meets the definition of
the statute. Thus the 1993 definition is not inconsistent with the
Washington Human Rights Commission's regulations, which define
marital status discrimination to include actions based on the identity of
an employee's spouse.'
Prior to the 1993 amendment, the statute and the regulations were
ambiguous in one important respect: the definition of marital status
discrimination in the regulations referred only to "what a person's
marital status is" without any further elaboration.' 22 This definition thus
failed to provide any guidance with respect to the primary phrase
"marital status." The circularity of the definition in the regulations
provided no check on the power of courts or future regulations to
significantly expand employees' protections by defining marital status
liberally to include, for example, same-sex relationships. The 1993
amendment, in contrast, specifies the relationships that may be at the root
of discrimination based upon marital status"u and thus clearly prohibits
such an expansion.
Concern about protection afforded to homosexuals is, in fact, the most
likely explanation for the 1993 amendment. It was passed when the issue
of extending employment discrimination protection to homosexuals

119. See supranote 39.
120. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(7) (1996 & Supp. 1997).
121. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150 (1997).
122. The current regulations retain the same language. See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16150(2)(a).
123. See supranote 50 and accompanying text.
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raised controversy in Washington State. 2 a In the same legislative session
in which the 1993 amendment was passed, the legislature considered and
rejected House Bill 1443, which addressed the problem of employment

discrimination against homosexuals." The legislature may have enacted
the 1993 amendment to prevent anti-discrimination provisions for

homosexuals from coming in through the statutory "back door" of
marital status.
The 1993 amendment thus cures the circularity in Washington's
administrative regulations by providing a definition of marital status.
Rather than narrowing the scope of the established protection for

employees, it prevents thefuture expansion of that protection. Therefore,
the Supreme Court of Washington should regard the 1993 amendment as
clarifying the regulations, rather than substantively changing the
established law.'26
Although regulations cannot have the effect of amending or changing
legislation, 27 the anti-discrimination statute as amended in 1993 and the
regulations pertaining to marital status do not directly conflict. 2 ' Where
124. Pat Matuska, Gay-Rights HearingIs Packed with Emotions, Seattle Times, Mar. 3, 1993, at
Bi; see also Editorial, Gay-Rights Bill-After 15 Years, Let's Pass This Measure, Seattle Times,
Mar. 18, 1993, at A16; Pat Matuska, Gay-DiscriminationBills Again Stir Debate-CrowdsFill the
Halls in Olympia To Air Views on Two Controversial Measures, Seattle Times, Mar. 27, 1993, at
All ; Barbara A. Serrano, FormerGOP Official With AIDS Backs Rights Bill-Foes of Gays Spread
Hate and Fear,He Tells Senators, Seattle Times, Feb. 18, 1994, at BI; Barbara A. Serrano, Gay
Community Pushes for Civil-Rights Law-Bill Would Ban Bias Statewide, Seattle Times, Jan. 2,
1994, at BI; Joseph Turner, Senate Dooms Gay Rights Bill by Failing To Vote on It, News Trib.
(Tacoma), Mar. 5, 1994, at Al.
125. The legislative digest indicated that House Bill 1443 "[e]xpands the jurisdiction of the
human rights commission to include practices of discrimination because of a person's... sexual
orientation." 2 Legislative Digest & History of Bills of the Senate and House of Representatives, 53d
Legis. 206 (Wash. 1993-94).
126. It could be argued that the exclusion of a same-sex relationship as a root cause of marital
status discrimination has an impact on the substantive content of the law because employees engaged
in same-sex relationships will not be able to bring legal claims for marital status discrimination.
However, the law against marital status discrimination in Washington to date has not been
interpreted as providing protection to employees engaged in same-sex relationships. The exclusion
of same-sex relationships from the definition of marital status therefore affects the Juture substance
of the law. The proposed interpretation of the 1993 amendment, as merely clarifying the regulations,
is consistent with the fact that the amendment does not impact the substance of the established scope
of marital status.
127. See Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368,383,610 P.2d 857, 865 (1980).
128. If the 1993 amendment was intended to substantively change the law by narrowing the
definition of marital status, then it would have been sensible to make this clear by repealing or
modifying the regulations setting out a broad definition of the term. The fact that the regulations
have remained unmodified for four years after the 1993 amendment was passed indicates that, in
proposing the 1993 amendment, the Human Rights Commission in fact had no intent to make a
substantive change in the law.
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regulations do not conflict with a statute, Washington courts have
deferred to the interpretation of the Human Rights Commission.'29 The
supreme court should therefore defer to the broad interpretation of
marital status in the Commission's 3 regulations 3 ' and follow the
precedent of Washington WaterPower.' 1
3.

The Legislative History of the 1993 Amendment Does Not Support
an InterpretationNarrowingthe ProtectionAgainst MaritalStatus
Discriminationfor Washington Citizens

Although it is clear that the 1993 amendment to Washington's antidiscrimination statute can be interpreted to be consistent with the broad
reading of marital status, Justice Sanders, in his dissent in Magula v.
Benton Franklin Title Co., made a forceful argument that the amendment
precludes such an interpretation.13 Assuming arguendo that the statute is
ambiguous, the absence of any legislative history of the 1993 amendment
supporting the Magula dissent's narrow reading nevertheless indicates
that the legislature had no intent to modify Washington's broad
definition of marital status.
If the legislature intended to make a substantive change in the law
when it passed the 1993 amendment, then surely it would have offered
an explanation or justification for the change. However, the record does
not include any legislative comment indicating that the amendment
would narrow the statute's protection. In fact, the Governor understood
that the bill was intended to strengthen, not weaken, civil rights in
Washington. 33 This is a reasonable interpretation of the bill, considering
129. Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash. 2d 97, 111-13, 922 P.2d 43, 50-51 (1996)
(deferring to Human Rights Commission's interpretation of Law Against Discrimination that allows
cause of action against independent contractors); Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 22 Wash.
App. 576, 581, 591 P.2d 461, 464 (1979) (relying on Human Rights Commission's construction of
term "handicap" in interpreting Law Against Discrimination). But see Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash. 2d
58, 68-69, 922 P.2d 788, 792 (1996) (invalidating Human Rights Commission's interpretation of
small employer exemption). See generally Michael Spiro, Note, JudicialDeference to Administrative
Construction of Washington's Law Against Discrimination:Griffin v. Eller and Marquis v. City of
Spokane, 72 Wash. L. Rev. 677 (1997) (arguing that Washington courts should defer to Human

Rights Commission's construction of Washington's anti-discrimination laws when Commission's
construction is reasonably consistent with legislative intent and purposes of statute).
130. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
131. Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62,
586 P.2d 1149 (1978); see also supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text
132. Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wash. 2d 171, 187, 930 P.2d 307, 315 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
133. See supra note 53 and accompanying text
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that it was proposed by the Human Rights Commission. 34 The Governor
also noted that the bill contained a number of "technical clean up
provisions" that did not warrant discussion.' While curing an ambiguity
in the regulations' definition might be described as a "technical clean
up," narrowing the protection for employees could not.
Additional support for interpreting the 1993 amendment as a
"technical clean up" rather than a substantive change can be found by
considering the role of the Washington Human Rights Commission. The
Commission drafted the detailed provisions of the Washington
Administrative Code that define marital status broadly to explicitly
include the identity and actions of an employee's spouse. 36 The dissent
in Magula contended that this definition conflicts with the 1993
amendment. Yet the Human Rights Commission itself requested the
introduction of the bill containing the 1993 amendment. 37 Because the
Commission has not given any indication that it has since changed its
policy on this issue, the absence of any explanation for a narrowing of
employee protections, or even any statement that such a narrowing was
the intent of the bill, supports the view that these provisions were simply
intended to clarify existing law, not constrict it.
4.

The BroadInterpretationofMaritalStatus Accords with the
InterpretationProvisionof the Anti-DiscriminationStatute

The broad interpretation of marital status, with a view to preventing
employers from acting upon damaging stereotypes, accords with the
construction provision of the Washington anti-discrimination statute.
This provision states that the chapter "shall be construed liberally for the
accomplishment of the purposes thereof."'3 As discussed above, the
purpose of anti-discrimination legislation is to prevent discrimination
based upon stereotypes attaching to certain classes of people.' 39 A broad
134. The Human Rights Commission proposed another bill in 1993. See 2 Legislative Digest &
History of Bills of the Senate and House of Representatives, 53d Legis. 224 (Wash. 1993-94). This
bill, which became effective on July 25, 1993, addressed federal Fair Housing Act requirements and
clearly expanded the protections afforded by Washington's anti-discrimination laws. See Act of
Apr. 21, 1993, ch. 69, 1993 Wash. Laws 190.
135. 1 Legislative Digest & History of Bills of the Senate and House of Representatives, 53d
Legis. 212 (Wash. 1993-94).
136. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
137.
138.
Wash.
139.

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020 (1996 & Supp. 1997); see also Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111
2d 903, 908, 766 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1989).
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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against all
interpretation of marital status is necessary to be effective
40
stereotypes attaching to people based upon marital status.'
5.

A SimilarProvisionHas Been FoundCompatiblewith a Broad
InterpretationofMaritalStatus

Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai'i)141 illustrates that a broad
interpretation of marital status is not incompatible with a statutory
definition similar to that in the 1993 amendment. Stouffer involved two
42
spouses employed by Stouffer Hotel Company as massage therapists.
The employer dismissed one of the spouses pursuant to its "no relatives"
policy. 43 That employee brought an action under Hawai'i's law alleging
discrimination on the basis of marital status.'" The statutory definition of
marital status in Hawai'i's discrimination statute is "the state of being
married or being single."' 45 The Supreme Court of Hawai'i adopted a
broad definition of marital status, holding that the definition included
discrimination based upon the identity or occupation of an employee's
spouse.'46 The court reasoned that a narrow definition of the statute
would be contrary to common sense, because it "ignores the simple fact
of life that when a person marries, it is always to a particular person with
a particular 'identity.' One does not 'marry' in some generic sense, but
marries a specificperson."'47 The court therefore found that the attributes
of a person's spouse, including identity and occupation, were "implicitly
subsumed" within the definition of marital status. 48 The court held that
the employee had been discriminated against because of the identity of
his spouse as an employee of Stouffer, and that the actions of the
49
employer had violated "the plain language and purpose" of the statute.
The definition of marital status in the Hawai'i statute resembles the
definition of marital status in Washington's 1993 amendment. If
anything, the Washington amendment is broader in that it covers a wider
range of marital statuses, not just being married or single, but also
140. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
141. 879 P.2d 1037 (Haw. 1994).
142. Id. at 1039.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 378-1 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997).
146. 879 P.2d at 1041-42.
147. Id. at 1041.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1042.
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separated, divorced, or widowed. 5 ' The decision of the Supreme Court
of Hawai'i in Stouffer demonstrates that it would be reasonable for the
Supreme Court of Washington to apply a broad interpretation of the term
marital status as defined by the 1993 amendment.
III. CONCLUSION
Strong policies favor a broad interpretation of marital status in
Washington's anti-discrimination legislation. First, employment
decisions based upon undesirable stereotypes about spouses, particularly
the stereotype that denies spouses their individual autonomy, are harmful
and should be prohibited by the anti-discrimination statute. Second, a
broad definition of marital status is necessary to implement the longstanding public policy of encouraging marriage. Third, employers'
interests will be safeguarded by the fact that in Washington a successful
plaintiff is required to prove an absence of business necessity for the
discriminatory action.
The Supreme Court of Washington should regard the 1993
amendment as curing the circularity in the definition of marital status and
preventing future expansion in the regulations, rather than as narrowing
the established substantive law. It should continue to interpret marital
status in a broad fashion to include the identity and actions of a person's
spouse. This interpretation is in accordance with previous Washington
case law, the Human Rights Commission's regulations, and legislative
intent. If a narrow interpretation of marital status discrimination is
adopted, as proposed by the Magula dissent, then the purpose of the antidiscrimination laws-to prevent employees from the operation of
harmful stereotypes-will be frustrated. Therefore, Washington should
continue to interpret its marital status anti-discrimination provisions to
include the identity and actions of an employee's spouse.

150. See supranote 50 and accompanying text
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